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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The requirement to have the annual and consolidated accounts of certain companies
audited by a qualified professional, which was introduced for the Community as a
whole by the Accounting Directives, is designed to protect the public interest. The
assurance offered by audited accounts should enhance the confidence of all parties
which are concerned with the affairs of companies. The increased transparency
resulting from the harmonisation of the financial information published by companies
together with the increased reliability of that information as a result of the audit by an
independent and qualified professional were regarded as an important contribution to
the completion of the Single Market.
1.2 The role of the statutory auditor has recently been the subject of much debate world-
wide. As a result in particular of a number of important financial failures, questions
have been raised concerning the function of the statutory audit and the independence
of the auditor. At EU level, it has been difficult to respond to these questions
because the regulatory framework which surrounds the statutory audit at EU level is
incomplete. There is no common view at EU level on the role, the position and the
liability of the statutory auditor. The absence of such a common view has a negative
impact on audit quality and on the freedom of establishment and freedom to provide
services in the audit field.
1.3 Against this background and in response to requests from the auditing profession, the
Commission considers it desirable to organise a wide-ranging reflection on the scope
and need for further EU level action in this area. Since the European Council of
Birmingham, the Green Paper has become one of the privileged instruments for the
consultation of Member States and interested parties. The present Green Paper is
intended to raise the awareness of all interested parties in the issues at stake and to
elicit their comments.
1.4 In drafting this document, the Commission took account of various studies which
have been produced in this field at national and international level
1. The Commission
itself launched a study on the role, the position and the liability of the statutory
auditor, which was carried out by the Maastricht Accounting and Auditing Research
Center (MARC), in order to establish a clear picture of the way in which the
statutory audit is dealt with in the legislation of Member States. It is intended to
discuss some of the issues raised in this document and the comments received at a
Conference which the Commission is organising on 5 and 6 December 1996
concerning the role, the position and the liability of the statutory auditor.
                                               
1 See bibliography annexed5
1.5 After a short description of the existing regulation of the statutory audit at EU level
and the reasons why renewed action at EU level may be justified, the document
discusses the main issues relating to the role and the position of the statutory auditor,
his liability, the audit in small companies, group audit arrangements and freedom of
establishment and freedom to provide services in the audit field. Each chapter
concludes with a short section suggesting possible priorities for action and ways and
means to tackle the issues at EU level. It is particularly on those points that
comments from interested parties would be welcome.6
2. REGULATION OF STATUTORY AUDIT AT EU LEVEL AND NEED FOR
EU ACTION
2.1 In accordance with the Fourth Council Directive (78/660/EEC) of 25 July 1978 on
the annual accounts of certain types of companies, all companies covered by the
Directive must have their annual accounts audited by a qualified professional. The
statutory auditor must also see to it that the annual report is consistent with the
annual accounts for the same financial year. Member States may exempt small
companies as defined in the Directive from the obligation to have their accounts
audited.
2.2 The Seventh Council Directive (83/349/EEC) of 13 June 1983 on consolidated
accounts has extended the audit requirement to all entities which draw up
consolidated accounts on the basis of the Directive. Similarly, the Council Directives
86/635/EEC of 18 December on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of
banks and other financial institutions and 91/674/EEC of 19 December 1991 on the
annual accounts and consolidated accounts of insurance undertakings have
introduced a requirement for all entities covered by those Directives to have their
annual accounts and consolidated accounts audited by a qualified professional.
2.3 Member States may only approve as auditors the persons who satisfy the conditions
of the Eighth Council Directive (84/253/EEC) of 10 April 1984 on the approval of
persons responsible for carrying out the statutory audits of accounting documents.
The conditions of approval concern professional qualifications on the one hand and
personal integrity and independence on the other.
2.4 While the Eighth Directive defines the minimum qualifications of the statutory
auditor it does not contain any specific guidance concerning the independence
requirement. At the time of adoption of the Directive, the Commission stated that
this situation was not satisfactory and that they reserved the right to come back to
this issue at a later stage. This has not yet been done. Similarly, the Proposed Fifth
Directive concerning the structure of public limited companies and the powers and
obligations of their organs, which contains provisions dealing with the appointment
and dismissal of the statutory auditor, the audit fee, the audit report and the liability
of the statutory auditor, remains on the Council table. Some of the issues concerned
are regulated at national level or are the subject of self-regulation through the
accountancy profession. There are however inevitable differences in the way they are
dealt with and there is often no legislative backing.7
2.5 The justification for EU interest and action in this area rests in the Single Market.
The audited financial statements of a company established in a Member State are
used by third parties in other Member States, such as investors, creditors and
employees. These third parties not unreasonably assume a certain level of assurance
and a certain coverage of the audit. Just as there have been pressures to standardise
these aspects of audits at a national level, partly in response to market forces, there is
also demand for some standardisation of these aspects of the audit at a European
level. It would of course be necessary to ensure that any standards which are
developed can be kept up to date in the face of changes emanating from the
development of the Information Society
2.6 There are also arguments related to the free movement of services and freedom of
establishment. Several studies launched by the Commission, notably on Competition
in European Accounting completed in 1992 and on the Role, the Position and the
Liability of the Statutory Auditor completed in 1996, have shown that there is not
yet a European market in audit services and that important differences remain
between the national laws and regulations of Member States which deal with the
statutory audit.
2.7 The 1992 study concludes that the need for the service provider to be located in the
same place as the client, coupled with various legal and professional obstacles, rules
out true cross-border trade. Measures taken towards harmonisation and mutual
recognition have some way to go in order to bring about significant changes in this
situation. The 1996 study concludes that if there is to be a European market for audit
services, initiatives are needed at EU level in two areas : freedom of establishment
notably of audit firms and freedom to provide services in the audit field on the one
hand and audit quality on the other hand. The report also concludes that differences
between the liability regimes in the Member States are likely to have a negative
impact on intra-Union trade in audit services.
2.8 Similar concerns were expressed in a position paper presented by the Fédération des
experts-comptables européens (FEE) in February 1996. In this document the
accountancy profession asks the Commission to look at a number of issues which are
particularly relevant for them and on which they believe that action at EU level is
necessary. These issues concern particularly the freedom of establishment of
statutory auditors and the freedom to provide cross-border audit services, as well as
professional liability.8
2.9 Finally, the lack of a harmonised view at EU level concerning the role, the position
and the liability of the statutory auditor risks becoming a serious handicap in the
negotiations which are taking place at international level with a view of improving
the access of the European companies to the international capital market. Last year,
the Commission presented a Communication to the Council and to the European
Parliament on "Accounting Harmonisation : a new strategy vis-à-vis international
harmonisation" (COM(95)508). In this Communication, the Commission announced
a new strategy which would allow global players in Europe to obtain capital on the
international capital market without having to comply with different requirements on
financial reporting. The Commission announced its support for the international
harmonisation process led by the International Accounting Standards Committee
(IASC) together with the International Organisation of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO), aiming at the establishment of a core set of accounting standards which
will be accepted in capital markets world-wide. Steps are being taken in order to
increase the influence of the EU in this international accounting harmonisation
process.
2.10 There is however a significant risk that the accounts and consolidated accounts
prepared by European companies will not be accepted in international capital markets
unless these accounts have been audited by an independent and qualified professional
in accordance with auditing standards which are regarded as generally acceptable
world-wide. The International Auditing Practices Committee of the International
Federation of Accountants (IFAC) has developed a number of international auditing
standards. The EU will have to decide whether it wants to support these standards
and if so, how and on what basis the European influence in the development of
international auditing standards can be increased.9
3. THE ROLE OF THE STATUTORY AUDITOR
A definition of the statutory audit
3.1 Although the Fourth and Seventh Directives require annual and consolidated
accounts to be audited by a qualified professional, the Directives do not contain a
definition of the statutory audit. Similarly, the Bank Accounts and Insurance
Accounts Directives require a statutory audit without defining what this means.
3.2 According to the definition adopted by the International Federation of Accountants
(IFAC), the objective of an audit is to enable the auditor to express an opinion on
whether the financial statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance
with an identified financial reporting framework.
3.3 Numerous studies have shown that there are considerable differences between what
the public expects from an audit and what the auditing profession believes that the
auditor should do. The expectation gap resulting from this is a major problem for
auditors since the greater the gap in expectations, the lower is the credibility and
prestige associated with their work. It is an issue for the public at large, because the
proper functioning of a market economy depends heavily on confidence in audited
financial statements.
3.4 Any definition of the statutory audit should consider the needs and the expectations
of users to the extent that they are reasonable, as well as the ability of the statutory
auditor to respond to those needs and expectations.
3.5 As far as the needs and expectations of users are concerned, they can be considered
reasonable if :
- the tasks have been prescribed by law ;
- there are stakeholders who are willing to pay for the service ( i.e. there is an
effective demand) ;
- there exists a statutory auditor who is willing to supply the service ( for a price
which reflects notably his level of qualification, the difficulty of the task, the
number of hours and the risk involved) and is competent to do so.
3.6 What statutory auditors can supply will depend not only on what clients are willing
to pay for, but also on the auditors' technical skills and attitude to risk. Some of the
demands placed on auditors may be unreasonable in that auditors cannot be expected
to possess the skills necessary to do the work.10
3.7 The public expects the statutory auditor to have a role in protecting the interests of
shareholders, creditors (e.g. suppliers, banks and credit institutions), pensioners,
employees and the public generally by providing them with reassurances concerning:
- the accuracy of financial statements
- the going concern status / solvency of the company
- the existence of fraud
- the respect by the company of its legal obligations
- the responsible behaviour of the company with regard to environmental and
societal matters.
It is useful to examine briefly the reasonableness of these expectations.
The accuracy of financial statements
3.8 There seems to be a widely held view among users of financial statements, that an
unqualified audit report guarantees the material accuracy of the financial statements.
3.9 There are two misconceptions inherent in this expectation. The first is that it is
possible to prepare financial statements that are "accurate" and the second is that the
financial statements are the responsibility of the auditor.
3.10 As to the first misconception, it is generally agreed among those who are well
informed about accounting that financial statements cannot be "accurate" in the sense
that there is only one set of figures that correctly expresses the results of a company's
operations and its financial status. The choices available for the accounting treatment
of complex business operations and the uncertainties implicit in management
decision-making defeat any attempt to develop a set of financial statements that all
informed observers would regard as "accurate".
3.11 In the EU, legal recognition that no set of financial statements can be uniquely
"right" is embodied in the requirement that the annual and consolidated accounts
should give a true and fair view, which is incorporated in the Accounting Directives.
The strength of the true and fair requirement, which is an overriding principle in the
Accounting Directives, is that it allows for the inevitably judgmental nature of many
accounting figures.
3.12 There has been considerable criticism of auditors for not taking a stronger line when
dealing with financial statements that comply "creatively" with the rules. When, in the
auditors' opinion, the financial statements are misleading as a result of the directors'
accounting choices and disclosure practices, auditing guidelines require the auditor
to issue a qualified opinion that states clearly all the factors giving rise to the
disagreement, the implications for the financial statements and, whenever practicable,
a quantification of the effect on the financial statements. Moreover, when the auditor
considers that the effect of the disagreement is so material or pervasive that the11
financial statements as a whole are misleading, auditing guidelines require him to
issue an adverse opinion.
3.13 The second misconception is that it is the statutory auditor who prepares the
financial statements and is responsible for them. On this issue there is no doubt that it
is the Board of Directors and not the statutory auditor which has the responsibility to
adopt financial statements (prepared by management) showing a true and fair view. It
is the directors and not the statutory auditor which determine the accounting
treatment and disclosure practices adopted in the financial statements. Directors are
in the best position to know the affairs of their company, to maintain its records and
to prepare its accounts. Auditors should be independent of and separate from the
management and supervisory boards of their clients. Their duties would therefore
seem quite distinct. They should state whether, in his view, the financial statements
have been prepared in accordance with the law and whether they show a true and fair
view.
The going concern status / solvency of the company
3.14 Several surveys have shown that there is an expectation on the part of a significant
proportion of the general public that the statutory auditor's report guarantees the
financial soundness of a company.
3.15 Annual accounts are prepared on the basis that the company will continue as a going
concern. Directors are entitled to adopt this basis only if they are satisfied that this is
indeed the case. (If it is not, different accounting rules apply.) Some countries are
considering a requirement for directors to comment explicitly on the ability of the
company to continue as a going concern and to take the necessary steps to ensure
that such comment is well founded.
3.16 Auditors have a duty to be alert to factors that may increase the company's financial
strength or decrease its resources, thus allowing them to assess whether the going
concern basis is appropriate. They should warn the directors or supervisory board as
soon as they become aware of matters that may threaten the going concern basis.
Acceptance of the going concern basis implies solvency, that is, that at the balance
sheet date the company's position was such that it would have been able to meet its
liabilities in full as they fell due. Users expect the audit report to contain the auditor's
opinion on solvency where the going concern basis is accepted.
3.17 Requiring this of the auditor would not relieve directors of the responsibility placed
on them by company law for determining whether or not a company is solvent, nor
mitigate the seriousness of their offence were they to continue trading while it was
insolvent². Directors' responsibilities are a continuing one, while the auditors' opinion
is based on the position as seen at a particular date.12
3.18 Auditors need to be cautious in the way they report publicly any concerns that they
may have. Continuance of a company may depend upon the rest of the world not
knowing that its status as a going concern is open to any doubt. If, for example,
auditors report that a company will continue as a going concern only if the bank
continues to roll over its loans and its suppliers continue to grant normal periods of
credit, this may result in the bank insisting on immediate repayment and the suppliers
insisting on cash on delivery.
3.19 On the other hand, some companies might still be in existence and shareholders' and
creditors' money saved if problems had been identified earlier. Moreover, there are
examples of companies that are able to continue trading despite its being public
knowledge that they suffer from liquidity problems and are subject to discussions
about financial reconstruction. Indeed, certain studies have found, comparing a set of
companies having a going concern qualification with a matched set having no
qualification that the survival rates were indistinguishable.
3.20 Some Member States have laid down specific procedures
2 to be followed by
directors and auditors when the going concern assumption is called into doubt
Different reports on corporate governance focus on this issue and some propose that
directors should provide auditors with a written statement confirming that, in their
view, the company will remain a going concern for the twelve months from the date
the directors approve the financial statements. The directors should provide the
auditors with evidence to support that view. Auditors will have a responsibility to
perform procedures specifically designed to test the directors' view that the company
is a going concern. The Cadbury Report
3 and the Vienot Report³ propose that
directors should be required to satisfy themselves that the going concern assumption
is reasonable and that they should report accordingly to shareholders. Auditors
should have a responsibility to test the directors' view that the company is a going
concern and to give their opinion on the matter.
3.21 Although neither the directors nor the statutory auditors can guarantee the
continuing financial soundness of a company, it seems reasonable to expect the
directors to state publicly whether in their judgement, given the trading environment
in which the company is operating and expects to operate, adequate financial
resources are available to enable it to remain a going concern for at least twelve
months from the day the directors adopt the financial statements. It seems equally
reasonable to expect the auditors to carry out procedures aimed at testing the
directors' stated judgement and to report publicly on the result of such tests.
                                               
2 These procedures go beyond what is presently required by virtue of Article 17 § 1 of the 2nd Council
Directive (77/91/EEC) of 13/12/1976 which states that in case of a serious loss of the subscribed
capital, a general meeting of shareholders must be called to consider whether the company should be
wound up or any other measures taken.
3  See Bibliography annexed.13
The existence of fraud
3.22 Audits have traditionally been associated with the detection of fraud. A survey
carried out in the UK in 1989 found that 75% of the general public, including the
majority of financially knowledgeable people, think that it is the statutory auditor's
responsibility to detect fraud of all kinds. The same survey found that 61% of the
general public think that it is the responsibility of the auditor actively to search for
fraud.
3.23 Until recently the standard auditor response was to say that the auditors' prime role is
not to prevent or detect fraud and that this is in any event impossible. It was not until
the 1980s that in some Member States, legislation sought to make explicit reference
to fraud reporting / detection as an audit objective. Since that period, governments
have become particularly concerned with issues of law and order, white collar crime
and investor protection following well-publicised affairs that made press headlines in
several Member States.
3.24 Regulatory bodies in a number of Member States have issued auditing guidelines
related to the statutory auditor's responsibility in relation to fraud, other irregularities
and errors. The guidelines specify the respective responsibilities of management and
of the auditor. Management has primary responsibility for the detection of fraud,
other irregularities and errors. This responsibility is seen as part of management's
stewardship role. The auditor's responsibility is to plan, perform and evaluate his
audit work so as to have a reasonable expectation of detecting material
misstatements in the accounts, whether they are caused by fraud, other irregularities
or errors.
3.25 The guidelines recommend that if, during the course of the audit, the statutory
auditor begins to suspect fraudulent activity, he has a responsibility to investigate
until his suspicions are either allayed or confirmed. In some Member States it is
recommended that the auditor promptly report to senior management all fraud
detected during the audit, even if the effect of the fraud is not material in the context
of the company's financial statements. The only circumstances in which auditors
should not so report is when they suspect senior management is involved in the
fraud. In these circumstances the auditor should report the matter to an appropriate
authority. In some Member States, statutory auditors are required to report to the
Ministry of Justice.
3.26 Auditing guidelines suggest that the auditor may need to take legal advice before
making a decision on whether the matter should be reported to a proper authority in
the public interest. The difficulty for auditors is that normally they will have to make
a decision based on their suspicions of fraud rather than on proven facts. If they
report their suspicions to a third party and are subsequently unable to establish firm
evidence of fraud they may be liable to legal action.14
3.27 In the financial sector, auditors' responsibilities in this regard have been clarified, in
most Member States, by legislation which releases auditors from their obligations of
confidentiality to their client organisations and give them the right but not the
obligation to report to a regulatory body.
It is now specifically provided for in Article 5.1 of a Council Directive 95/26/EC
adopted in June 1995 that the statutory auditor of a financial undertaking" shall have
a duty to report promptly to the competent authorities any fact or decision
concerning that undertaking of which he has become aware while carrying out that
task which is liable to :
- constitute a material breach of the laws, regulations or administrative provisions
which lay down the conditions governing authorisation or which specifically govern
pursuit of the activities of financial undertakings, or
- affect the continuous functioning of the financial undertaking, or
- lead to refusal to certify the accounts or to the expression of reservations ; ..."
This Directive also provides in its Article 5.2 that : " The disclosure in good faith to
the competent authorities, by persons authorised within the meaning of Directive
84/253/EEC (the statutory auditor), of any factor or decision referred to in
paragraph 1 shall not constitute a breach of any restriction on disclosure of
information imposed by contract or by any legislative, regulatory or administrative
provision and shall not involve such persons in liability of any kind".
This Directive is to be implemented in all Member States by July 1996
3.28 If the fraud is material, statutory auditors need to ensure that the financial statements
reflect the effect of the fraud and that all necessary details are disclosed. Provided the
auditors are then convinced that the financial statements give a true and fair view, it
is not necessary to qualify the audit report. If the fraud is not material in the context
of the financial statements, it is the responsibility of the directors to decide whether
disclosure is necessary. However, since undetected material fraud will result in
financial statements which do not present a true and fair view of the company's
affairs, it would seem that auditors have a duty to employ the means which they think
are necessary to detect material fraud if their opinion is to be valid.
3.29 The public expects the opportunities for fraud to be minimised. It seems reasonable
to expect the Board of Directors to take responsibility for setting up and maintaining
systems of internal control that, inter alia, minimise the opportunities for fraud and
maximise the likelihood that any such fraud will be quickly detected. It seems also
reasonable to expect statutory auditors to confirm in the audit report that such
systems of internal control exist and to say whether or not they appear well designed
to serve their purpose. In the same way, it would appear reasonable to expect
auditors to support the directors in their attempts to prevent and detect fraud by
reporting to the directors any weaknesses they may have identified in these systems
of internal control and any suspicions they may have in regard to fraud.15
The respect by the company of its legal obligations
3.30 It appears to be the general view that it is the auditor's duty to detect contravention
of company law or of statutory regulations which specifically relate to company law.
The auditor cannot however be reasonably expected to report on matters beyond his
competence or expertise, especially in today's complex legal environment.
3.31 The directors should take responsibility for setting up and maintaining systems of
internal control that, inter alia, minimise the opportunities for committing illegal acts
in the name of the company and that maximise the likelihood that any such illegal
acts will be quickly detected. It would seem reasonable to expect the statutory
auditor to confirm in his audit report that such systems of internal control exist and
to say whether or not they appear well-designed to serve their purpose.
3.32 In addition, as part of their responsibility to prepare financial statements which show
a true and fair view, directors must ensure that the statements reflect the financial
implications of illegal acts detected, if these implications are judged to be material.
The statutory auditor, as part of his responsibility to express an opinion on whether
the financial statements give a true and fair view, must confirm that the statements
reflect the financial implications of any such illegal acts.
Responsible behaviour by the company with regard to environmental and societal
matters
3.33 There have been demands over recent years for companies to be subject to an audit
of their social behaviour, most notably in respect of the physical environment but also
in terms of employment practices, safety of operations, trade sanctions, product
development policies and other issues of concern to the general public and to
particular interest groups.
3.34 Without entering into the merits of such an audit or audits, it might be asked whether
the statutory auditor has appropriate qualifications and experience to carry out this
work, or whether it should be a separate exercise from the statutory audit and be
carried out by qualified experts in the area(s).
3.35 Although it is unreasonable to expect the statutory auditor to make judgements on
matters outside his competence and expertise, it can be argued that auditors should
accept that their responsibilities will tend to increase in line with public expectations.
The auditor can, given time and a sufficiently clear consensus on what is expected,
avail himself of the necessary expertise in areas which go beyond strict financial
audit.16
Priorities for action and possible methods
3.36 The absence of a common definition of the statutory audit in the EU creates a
damaging expectation gap. A common approach to the statutory audit, taking
account of the latest developments at international level, seems desirable. If the audit
is to add confidence to published financial statements, users need to know what the
audit certificate means in terms of assurance. In this regard, particular attention
should go to the role of the auditor in respect of the going concern status of the
company and the action to be undertaken by the auditor in case of fraud and other
illegal acts.
3.37 Consideration should be given to what extent existing International Standards on
Auditing could be the starting point of a common definition of the statutory audit.
Full account would also need to be taken, however of any particularities which
distinguish the European from the international environment.
3.38 To be effective, the common definition would need to become part of the regulatory
framework in all Member States. It is for consideration whether an EU Directive
would be needed to achieve this result or whether a Recommendation would suffice.
In either case, due attention would need to be paid to flexibility, so that any legal
requirement can easily be adapted to the rapidly changing environment in which the
auditor operates.
The audit report
Contents of the audit report
3.39 The audit report is the medium through which the statutory auditor communicates
with shareholders, creditors, employees and with the public at large. It is the result of
the audit process. Usually, a distinction is made between a "long form" audit report
and a "short form" audit report. The "long form" report is addressed to management
and is not normally made available to the public.
3.40 Although the content of the audit report is not prescribed under the Accounting
Directives, company law in most Member States has specified the matters which
have to be included in the published audit report. Professional bodies in all Member
States have established standard forms of published audit reports. However, only
three Member States have made it a binding rule that those standard forms be used.
3.41 In general, the audit report concerning the annual accounts in Member States would
normally contain the following information :
- whether the auditor has obtained all the information and explanations which, to
the best of his knowledge and belief, are necessary for the purposes of his audit
;
- whether, in his opinion, proper books and records have been kept by the
company ;17
- whether the annual report is consistent with the annual accounts ;
- whether the annual accounts give a true and fair view of the company's assets,
liabilities, financial position and profit or loss ;
- whether the annual accounts comply with the requirements of company law ;
- whether the audit was carried out in accordance with auditing standards.
3.42 Looking at the audit reports of the largest listed companies in Member States, one
could say that, in their present form, users can derive comfort only from the absence
of a qualification to the financial statements. They give users no help in
understanding what the auditors, who are appointed by shareholders and report to
them, actually do in return for the audit fee paid to them. Without this information, it
is difficult to see how investors and other users can form a conclusion with any
degree of confidence on the weight they can place on the auditors' opinion.
3.43 There seems to be a general consensus that more information should be given about
the scope and nature of the work on which the audit report is based. Users very often
consider the audit report as an assurance or a certificate for their decision making. It
is necessary that the audit report clearly states the auditor's responsibilities for
reporting on the financial statements.
3.44 The results of recent surveys have shown that harmonisation of the form and the
wording of the audit report has increased in the EU over the last ten years. This is to
a large extent the consequence of a more widespread and consistent adoption of the
relevant International Standard on Auditing. Differences still exist however between
Member States with regard to the wording and the coverage of the standard short
form statutory audit report. These differences have a single market impact to the
extent that they reduce the utility of reports issued in other Member States. In
principle, where similar statutory audit work has been performed, this should be
clearly communicated by way of similar wording in the audit report.
Priorities for action and possible methods
3.45 Once an agreement has been reached on the definition of the statutory audit, it
should be easier to agree on the minimum content of the audit report. Because the
audit report is the medium through which the statutory auditor communicates with
shareholders, creditors, employees and with the public at large, it seems desirable
that a similar wording in the audit report is used throughout the EU.18
3.46 In several Member States the wording of the audit report has been adapted to that
developed by the International Federation of Accountants. It is for consideration to
what extent this could also be the starting basis for a common definition at EU level.
Proper attention would however need to be given to any particularities which
distinguish the European from the international environment. In order to reduce the
expectation gap, it would be necessary for the audit report to provide more
information on what the auditor has actually done, which professional standards he
has applied in carrying out his task and whether the financial information prepared by
the company conforms with legal and other regulatory requirements. It would also be
necessary for any reservations which the auditor might have to be clearly spelled out
in his report.
3.47 As for the definition of the statutory audit, it seems necessary for the common
definition of the audit report to have legislative backing in the Member States. It is
for consideration whether this points to binding legislation ( i.e. a Directive) at the
EU level, or whether a Commission Recommendation would be enough. Due
attention must in any case be paid to flexibility, so that any legal requirement could
be easily adapted to the rapidly changing environment in which the auditor operates,
in particular developments related to the introduction of new information
technologies.19
4 THE POSITION OF THE STATUTORY AUDITOR
The competence of the statutory auditor
Competence in the Eighth Directive
4.1 There can be no doubt that the demands put on the statutory auditor require this
auditor to be a highly qualified professional. This is the reason why the Eighth
Directive of 10 April 1984 on the approval of persons responsible for carrying out
the statutory audits of accounting documents has put the competence of the statutory
auditor at a very high level indeed.
4.2 However, differences in the educational systems of the Member States cannot be
ignored. These were a source of difficulties when attempts were made at the time of
implementation of the Directive to compare national educational levels in the
Member States. As a result, the accounting profession in Europe has stressed the
need for professionals who want to offer cross-border services to acquire the host
country professional title.
4.3 Although the Eighth Directive has led to some harmonisation in this field, there are
still important differences. There is at present no common understanding about the
contents of the different courses which are listed in Article 6 of the Eighth Directive
and which are part of the test of theoretical knowledge. The lack of a common
understanding became clearly apparent when new Member States joined the EU and
when Central and Eastern European countries asked for technical assistance for the
establishment of training programmes for auditors.
4.4 The development of information technology is likely to have important consequences
for the audit function. It is sometimes seen as a threat to auditors, because of the
diminishing importance of published financial statements to investors who may be
able to obtain financial information on a permanent basis through different means. It
can however also offer new opportunities, in terms of new attest functions associated
with the new information flows, systems and types of information that reporting
entities will provide to users as the information era moves forward. This is bound to
have implications for the educational requirements which are presently included in
the Eighth Directive and which were established taking account of the audit function
in a different technological environment. For this and other reasons, it may be
necessary to adapt or clarify Article 6 of the Eighth Directive.20
Priorities for action and possible methods
4.5 It is regrettable that neither the accounting profession, nor the academic community
have taken any concrete steps to clarify the competence requirements listed in the
Eighth Directive. It would appear that the definition of a curriculum for the
education of auditors should be primarily a task for those who are directly involved
in the educational process. More harmonisation in this field would certainly facilitate
the application of the Mutual Recognition Directives ( see also section 8 ). In this
context, it should be evident that the training process must prepare the auditors to
operate in a Single Market. Such an initiative at European level could be undertaken
for instance in the framework of the new Community programme SOCRATES and in
particular Chapter I - ERASMUS, Action 1.D on University co-operation projects
on subjects of mutual interest ("Thematic Networks"), which provide a reflection
forum involving representatives of the socio-economic and professional world in
specific subject study areas, including those of other countries participating in these
programmes.
4.6 Updating the list of courses included in Article 6 of the Eighth Directive will require
an amendment to the Directive. If and when that is considered opportune,
consideration should be given to the introduction of a procedure which will allow it
to be further amended in future without passing through the full legislative
procedure.
The independence of the statutory auditor
Definition of independence
4.7 In accordance with the Eighth Directive, the statutory auditor must be independent.
At the time of adoption of the Directive, it was impossible to agree on a common
definition of independence. As a result, this subject has been dealt with differently by
Member States.
4.8 As pointed out by FEE
4, independence is the main means by which the statutory
auditor demonstrates that he can perform his task in an objective manner. In dealing
with independence, it is necessary to address both independence of mind, i.e. the
state of mind which has regard to all considerations relevant to the task in hand and
independence in appearance, i.e. the avoidance of facts and circumstances which are
so significant that an informed third party would question the statutory auditor's
objectivity.
                                               
4 See bibliography21
4.9 In recent years, concern has been expressed about the threats which have developed
to auditors' independence. Several surveys reported on the fact that companies were
increasingly prepared to challenge auditors, to shop for opinions, to seek legal advice
on auditors' views and to change auditors. Some reports concluded that, given the
competitive pressures, it would be idealistic to assume that all auditors are at all
times unmindful of the risk of losing business. Criticism has been voiced that the
professionalism of the audit function has diminished in favour of a more
"businesslike" attitude.
4.10 Moreover, it has become, more common for the audit to be put out to tender. The
principal objective in seeking competitive tenders is to obtain the services of the
auditors as cheaply as possible. It is sometimes suggested that management resort to
tendering in order to put pressure on the incumbent auditors, particularly when
disputes have arisen.
4.11 The growing intensity of competition for audit "business", and especially for the
audit of large "prestige" companies, is also a cause of concern. There is no doubt that
competition sometimes results in low-cost and perhaps even below-cost tenders. The
procedure of calls for tenders which ensures transparency and competition, should
not have as a consequence that auditors quote an audit fee which does not allow
them to carry out their work in accordance with professional standards
5. Some
observers infer that the successful tenderers expect to recoup the balance of the full
cost of the audit from non-audit consultancy services. This points to another concern
which relates to the provision of non audit services.
4.12 The question whether the auditor should provide other services to his audit client has
been the subject of much debate. It has been advocated that the provision of other
services to an audit client is likely to increase the auditor's understanding of the
client's business and operations and therefore results in a better audit. Is has also
been argued that there is no evidence that the volume of non-audit fees in relation to
the level of audit fees is a threat to objectivity. Nevertheless, there is an equally
strong belief that the provision of a broad range of non-audit services to an existing
audit client can impair audit objectivity. Safeguards are necessary to respond to these
concerns.
                                               
5 In the case of public procurement, the Council has adopted a set of rules assuring transparency in
competition for the award of public entities contracts. These rules also apply to audit services. See
Directives 92/50/EEC and 93/38/EEC - Annex 1A - Category 9.22
4.13 Such safeguards could consist in confining the provision of other services to those
whose nature and quality are consistent with the auditor's professional image and
which are unlikely to impair his objectivity, or in requiring the fee for both audit and
non-audit services to be disclosed. A solution which would consist in preventing the
auditor from providing any other service to his audit client would clearly solve the
appearance problem. However, practice has shown that this solution is not a viable
alternative, as it is too easy to circumvent by having the service provided by an
affiliated or associated firm.
4.14 In all cases the auditor should ensure that he and his firm are not involved in the
management or decision making of his client. The auditor should not be engaged in
the preparation of the financial statements of his client, be involved in the valuation
of assets or liabilities for purposes of recording them in the financial statements, act
for the client in the resolution of litigation which may have a material impact on the
financial statements, or perform services having a direct impact upon senior
management such as their recruitment.
4.15 Some commentators find cause for concern where a company retains the same
auditors for a long period. It is argued that this can lead to too close and cosy a
relationship with management, with the auditors becoming too responsive to
management's wishes. The question whether the statutory audit should be made
subject to a system of mandatory rotation has been the subject of considerable
debate. The arguments in favour of such a system are not conclusive. In this context,
it is important to note that one of the two Member States which had a system of
mandatory rotation has recently abolished it. A solution which could enhance the
perception of the auditor's objectivity, without causing the efficiency and quality
drawbacks of firm rotation, could consist in setting up a rotation of audit partners
within the same firm.
Priorities for action and possible methods
4.16 Independence is an important issue. Based on different traditions and experiences,
this issue is dealt with differently in Member States. It is unlikely that it will be
possible in the short term to agree at EU level on a common definition covering the
various issues raised in relation with auditor independence. The adoption of a set of
rules which regulate independence does not by itself bring about independence in
practice. However, agreement on a common core of essential principles in all
Member States would constitute an important step towards the establishment of an
internal market for audit services. These principles could be developed by the
profession at EU level.
4.17 It is for consideration which instrument is most appropriate to ensure that an
agreement reached at EU level is likely to be adhered to in practice.23
The position of the statutory auditor within the company
The statutory audit and corporate governance
4.18 The statutory audit is an essential element of the system of corporate governance. In
order to put the statutory audit in the right perspective, it is necessary to distinguish
the role of the various organs of the company in the field of financial reporting.
While the directors are responsible for the preparation of the financial statements, the
role of the statutory auditor is to report to the shareholders on the financial
statements presented to him by the directors. In doing so, the statutory auditor acts
in the interests of the shareholders who have a financial stake in the company. In
addition, his report lends credibility to the financial information used by third parties.
4.19 Because the shareholders have the most direct interest in the outcome of the
statutory audit, all Member States have given the right to appoint and to dismiss the
auditor to the shareholders in the general meeting. However, for the shareholders of
most listed companies, as a result of their large numbers and transient nature, there is
no effective mechanism for them to do so. It is usually the directors who effectively
appoint and dismiss the statutory auditor, with the decision merely being ratified by
the shareholders at the annual general meeting. A consequence of this is that
statutory auditors are criticised for not being independent of the directors. It is
argued that, in disputes between the directors and the statutory auditor on issues
such as accounting policy choices, the statutory auditor has an incentive to concede
to the wishes of the directors. The statutory auditor may be put in a particularly
difficult position in such disputes if the directors have gathered opinions from
competing firms of auditors.
4.20 It is argued that another result of the auditors being effectively appointed by the
directors is that, due to cost pressures, both parties have reduced the role of the
statutory audit to the minimum necessary to fulfil the legal requirements of company
law as interpreted by the auditing firms themselves. It is argued that this has led to
less attention being given by the statutory auditors to the assessment of the efficiency
and effectiveness of companies' internal control systems, which could lead to an
increased incidence of fraud and other illegal acts.
4.21 The agreement of the statutory auditors' remuneration with the directors creates a
further problem. The audit fee is normally agreed in advance and is based on the
usually valid assumption that the auditors will not find any evidence of malpractice.
However if, in the course of their work, the auditors become suspicious that there
has been fraudulent activity that they feel should be subject to further investigation,
they will have to agree with the directors a fee for this additional work. If the
directors are involved in the malpractice, the statutory auditor finds himself in a very
difficult situation.24
4.22 In order to preserve the independence and objectivity of the statutory auditor,
procedures giving greater assurance that the shareholders are able to make a real
choice, for instance through a greater use of audit committees and/or reforms of
board procedures or through the association of other parties, such as the workers
council in the appointment and dismissal of the auditor, have been developed or are
currently been examined in certain Member States.
4.23 Both the Cadbury report in the United Kingdom and the Vienot report in France
recommend that the board of directors in listed companies should establish an audit
committee of at least three non-executive directors, chaired by one of their members.
Since 1978, the New York Stock Exchange has required all listed companies to have
audit committees composed solely of independent directors and the 1987 report of
the American Treadway Commission
6 concluded that audit committees had a critical
role to play in ensuring the integrity of US companies financial reports. Experience in
the United States has shown that, even where audit committees might have been set
up mainly to meet listing requirements, they have proved their worth and developed
into essential committees of the board of directors.
4.24 However, it is likely that companies without a strong internal audit function will be
unable to provide an audit committee with sufficient information to fulfil its
responsibilities. The scope of the work of the statutory auditor and the timing of the
statutory audit are unlikely to be adequate and appropriate for this purpose.
Furthermore, the statutory audit is essentially a snapshot at a particular point in time
whereas assessment of the effectiveness of a company's management information
systems and systems of internal control should be undertaken on a continuous basis.
Consequently, recommendations have been made for the appointment in major
companies of a chief internal auditor to lead a strong internal audit team that is
capable of providing the audit committee with sufficient information to fulfil its
responsibilities on behalf of the board. As stated by the European Confederation of
Institutes of Internal Auditing in their position paper on Internal Auditing in Europe
7,
the furnishing of objective and timely appraisals of the quality of an organisation's
internal control and systems for managing business risk, would contribute
significantly to strengthening management's control of the operations, thus
contributing to sound corporate governance. In their view, it is necessary for the EU
to introduce binding legislation for significant enterprises and sectors requiring the
establishment of a professional internal auditing function and regulating qualifications
and experience required, as well as the duties of the Board and Chief Executive in
relation to internal audit conclusions and recommendations.
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4.25 In Member States, the length of the statutory audit appointment varies from a fixed
period of 1 year to 6 years to an indefinite period. In the Amended Proposal for a
Fifth Council Directive it is proposed that the statutory auditor should be appointed
for a specified period of not less than three financial years, and not more than six
financial years.
4.26 The 1996 study carried out for the Commission shows that the position of the
statutory auditor within the company is not the same in all Member States.
Differences range from an external adviser to an organ of the company. In some
cases there even exists a dual audit requirement, which means that in addition to the
statutory audit requirement following from the Accounting Directives, there is
another audit imposed by the Stock Exchange Regulatory Authority. It is not clear
that such a system offers any advantages in terms of improved control. On the other
hand, it can lead to confusion concerning the relative status of the different auditors,
especially if they come to different conclusions concerning the same company.
Priorities for action and possible methods
4.27 Recent debates about corporate governance have stressed the need to define more
clearly the role of the board of directors in preparing the financial statements. The
issue is however much more complicated and extends to defining the role of all
parties involved in the financial reporting process (board of directors, supervisory
board, general meeting of shareholders, auditor). In order to improve the system of
checks and balances within the company, more attention should be paid to issues
such as the creation of an audit committee and the establishment of a proper
functioning system of internal control.
4.28 It is difficult to deal at EU level with matters of corporate governance : past efforts
to harmonise law on the structure of the company have not succeeded. In order to
contribute to the debate at national level, it might be useful to consider a
Recommendation at EU level on possible ways to improve the present system of
corporate governance, especially in as far as it relates to financial reporting. It would
then be up to Member States to initiate any necessary legislative action at national
level.
The role of governmental and professional bodies
Quality control
4.29 In accordance with the Eighth Directive, auditors must be approved by an authority
designated by Member States. This authority must see to it that the persons approved
as statutory auditors satisfy all the requirements imposed by the Directive and that
they carry out audits in accordance with the principles of professional integrity and
independence.
4.30 Most Member States have delegated the authority to approve the statutory auditor to
one or more professional associations. In such cases, it is important that these
associations also supervise the way in which their members conduct the audit. Most
of these associations have developed professional rules describing the way in which26
the audit has to be carried out. These auditing standards are often inspired by the
standards developed by IFAC. This is not, however, the case in all Member States
and these auditing standards, where they are applied, are in most cases only a
recommendation and not a legal requirement. There is at this stage therefore no
guarantee that the statutory audits carried out by professionals approved on the basis
of the Eighth Directive are of equivalent quality.
4.31 Similarly, the way in which professional associations supervise their members is not
the same. While some associations have organised peer review systems, whereby the
work of an auditor is at regular intervals reviewed by another auditor, other
associations have set up a special unit responsible for reviewing the way in which
members carry out statutory audits. Here again, there is no guarantee that quality
review systems in the various Member States are equivalent, or even adequate.
4.32 Some Member States have decided not to delegate the authority to approve auditors
to a professional association but have this task carried out by a Ministry or by
another body, such as a Chamber of Commerce. In this case too, appropriate
arrangements need to be made to ensure that there is quality control and that actions
are undertaken in cases where the auditors do not carry out their tasks in accordance
with the principles of professional integrity and independence.
4.33 In most Member States, special audit requirements apply to companies in the
financial sector which are subject to prudential control by a competent authority.
These additional requirements have been set up to ensure the protection of investors
and policyholders. In addition, Member States may authorise exchanges of
information under strict conditions and between the competent authorities of the
financial sector and the professional body of the statutory auditor, according to
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 4 of Directive 95/26/EC.
Priorities for action and possible methods
4.34 The absence of a legal requirement at EU level that all statutory audits conducted on
the basis of Community law must be carried out on the basis of an agreed set of
auditing standards is a handicap for the Single Market and in the international
context. It should be examined whether the standards on auditing developed by the
International Auditing Practices Committee of the International Federation of
Accountants and already applied to a certain extent in most Member States could
provide a possible basis for agreed standards at EU level. As with international
accounting standards, it would seem necessary to devise a mechanism to determine
whether existing IFAC standards meet European requirements and to ensure
increased European influence in the development of international auditing standards.27
4.35 Such a mechanism at EU level could bring together all parties involved at national
level in the definition of auditing standards and could discuss all relevant auditing
matters. It would be important that an assurance be obtained that any auditing
standards agreed upon at EU level were actually being followed in practice at
national level. This might be difficult to achieve without giving those standards some
kind of legal backing.
4.36 Even if a code of principles on auditor independence and a core set of auditing
standards can be agreed upon, the system will only be effective if the standards are
enforced and if there is appropriate quality control. If a mechanism were set up at EU
level, as suggested above, one of its tasks could also consist in examining the way in
which quality control in the audit field is assured in the various Member States.
Within the context of the Single Market, it is also important that the regulatory
authorities in Member States communicate with each other. The rules of professional
secrecy should not present any obstacle to this.28
5. AUDITOR'S CIVIL LIABILITY
Towards a limited liability ?
5.1 Professional liability is an important issue for auditors. In some Member States, audit
firms have been made responsible in a number of cases for amounts which were
disproportionate with the audit fee and with the auditor's direct responsibility for the
financial failure. The auditor usually disposes of professional indemnity insurance and
there is a tendency to sue by preference the party whose professional liability has
been insured.
5.2 There are major differences as to the liability regime of the statutory auditor within
the EU. In some Member States, there exists a legal civil liability cap, limiting the
amount of damages that the statutory auditor might have to pay in the case of
litigation. In other Member States, auditors can limit their liability by contract.
Differences also exist regarding the possibility for the courts to limit the amount of
damages in the case of litigation.
5.3 Various suggestions have been made in order to arrive at a regime which could be
regarded as more equitable to the auditor. These suggestions include the
generalisation of a legal liability cap, the possibility for the auditor to limit his liability
by contract, the incorporation of the audit firm into a limited liability company, the
introduction of proportional liability and the introduction of mandatory professional
insurance for auditors and for directors.
5.4 The original proposal for a Fifth Company Law Directive provided for unlimited
liability of the statutory auditor to third parties. The amended proposal contains no
provision directly imposing upon the statutory auditor a liability to third parties, but
provides for liability of the auditor only to the audited company, stating that these
provisions do not in any way exclude an auditor's liability to shareholders and third
parties under the general private law of the Member States. During the negotiation of
this proposal in the Council of Ministers working group, the text was further clarified
by stating that it is up to the Member States to regulate the civil liability of the
persons responsible for the statutory audit so as to ensure that compensation is made
for any damage sustained by the company, any shareholder or third party as a result
of wrongful acts committed by the auditors in carrying out their duties. Member
States could however allow the limitation by law or by contract of the civil liability to
the audited company on the basis of negligence. Discussions on the Fifth Directive
were however discontinued in 1991.29
5.5 Meanwhile, it cannot be denied that the existence of different liability regimes in
Member States has internal market consequences. As a result of an extensive liability
regime, audit firms may avoid high-risk clients or even entire industries, calling into
question the very rationale for a compulsory statutory audit. Costs of statutory audits
to clients in highly litigious Member States may be higher than elsewhere. Insurance
premiums throughout the EU might become more expensive as a result of litigation
in some Member States. This might lead to a further concentration of the audit
market in the hands of a limited number of audit firms. To the extent that there exists
a legal or contractual liability cap only in some Member States, there might be a
tendency to sue the auditor preferably in those Member States where there is no such
liability cap.
Priorities for action and possible methods
5.6 There can be no doubt that the clarification of the role and the position of the
statutory auditor would have a positive effect on the assessment of his liability in the
case of an audit failure. Whilst there does not seem to be a reason to confine the
liability of the auditor to the audited company - as the statutory audit has been
required in the public interest - it would seem reasonable that the liability of the
auditor should be limited to amounts which reflect his degree of negligence.
5.7 Action at EU level in this field is likely to be difficult. The audit profession is not the
only profession which is struggling with problems of liability. Furthermore, the legal
traditions in Member States in the area of civil liability are quite different. It is for
consideration whether the negative effects of a continuation of differences in the
regulation of audit liability are significant enough to justify EU action, considering
the difficulties which such action is likely to face and the possible discrimination
which action specific to the audit profession might entail as regards other
professions.30
6. THE STATUTORY AUDIT IN SMALL COMPANIES
The small company audit
6.1 In accordance with Article 51(2) of the Fourth Directive, Member States may relieve
small companies, as defined in Article 11
8, from the requirement to have their annual
accounts audited by a qualified professional. Important reasons for this exemption
were the wish not to create an additional burden for small companies but also the
risks involved in a small company audit, where the auditor can rarely rely on
appropriate internal control mechanisms. Where the exemption has been granted,
Member States must introduce appropriate sanctions in order to ensure that the
annual accounts and the annual report are prepared in conformity with the
requirements of the Directive.
6.2 On the basis of Article 51 (2), most Member States have exempted small companies
from the audit requirement, although the criteria for defining a small company do not
necessarily correspond with the thresholds included in the Directive. In 1989, the
Commission proposed to require all Member States to abolish the audit requirement
for small companies. This proposal was strongly resisted by a number of Member
States. It was argued that published accounts which had not been subject to an audit
by a qualified professional could be misleading. It was also argued that the audit is in
the interest of the company itself because it provides the company with the expertise
of a qualified professional.
6.3 Considerations of independence play a lesser role in a small company where the
auditor fulfils the role both of an adviser and of an external controller. It is not
uncommon for the auditor in a small company to keep the books and records and to
audit the financial statements. This certainly raises questions as to the independence
of this professional and the usefulness of such an audit. This is the reason why some
Member States forbid the auditor to be involved in the preparation of the financial
statements of the company which he audits. In practical terms, this means that the
company will have to pay for the services of two different experts, one expert who
keeps the books and records and prepares the financial statements and another expert
who carries out the statutory audit.
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6.4 Some Member States have recognised the different reality of a small company audit
and have created different professions, one profession which is primarily engaged in
advising and auditing small companies and another profession which concentrates on
large companies. Other Member States have made a distinction between micro-
companies and small companies, whereby micro-companies are exempted from the
audit requirement, while small companies are made subject to a so-called compilation
report, which does not give the same assurance of a full audit but still gives some
reassurance to users that the accounts have been properly kept.
6.5 Medium-sized companies fall somewhere in between the two categories. The general
feeling seems to be that these companies should still be required to have their
accounts audited by a qualified professional. In that case, the same criteria should
apply as in the case of large companies in terms of independence and audit quality.
6.6 If one considers the question whether a statutory audit is useful in the case of small
and medium-sized companies, it is important to keep in mind that there is a tendency
to use the vehicle of limited liability companies which are not subject to an audit
requirement as a means for money laundering. The question whether a company
should be subject to an audit requirement can therefore not be seen exclusively in
terms of deregulation. Arguments relating to public policy also need to be taken into
account.
Priorities for action and possible methods
6.7 It is for consideration whether any change in the regulatory environment at EU level
is desirable or necessary concerning the statutory audit in small and medium sized
companies. At this stage, the Commission does not consider that convincing
arguments have yet been advanced for changing the approach in the Fourth Directive
whereby Member States can exempt small companies from the statutory audit.
Moreover, it seems unlikely that Member States which require a statutory audit
would be prepared to do away with it. Similarly the case has not been convincingly
made for allowing or requiring the exemption of medium-sized companies from the
audit requirement.32
7. GROUP AUDIT ARRANGEMENTS
The statutory audit in groups of companies
7.1 Consolidated financial statements portray the financial position and results of a group
as if it were a single entity. The statutory audit of consolidated financial statements
should be carried out with no impediments and obstacles greater than those
encountered in the statutory audit of the financial statements of a single legal entity.
With the increasing complexity of international business and the ease with which
funds can be transferred from country to country, it is of increasing importance that
the statutory auditor of a group has a total picture of the significant activities within
a group. This can be difficult in the case of groups having operations in more than
one jurisdiction.
7.2 In practice, difficulties arise because there are no specific rules which offer guidance
in the case of group audits. It is sometimes difficult for the group auditor to obtain
information from the management and the auditors of the group companies which he
does not audit. He may receive audited financial statements for the individual
subsidiary undertakings, but he is not in a position to question the underlying
rationale for the accounting treatment of transactions reflected in the financial
statements. The group auditor may not have a total picture of the significant
activities within the group. Difficulties may also arise due to the rules of professional
secrecy.
7.3 Possible solutions to these problems have been advanced : joint audit appointments,
the development of a comprehensive and integrated standard on group audits, the
granting of full access to all information necessary for the group auditor to carry out
his tasks and the appointment of a single statutory auditor to all group companies.
Priorities for action and possible methods
7.4 The conduct of a statutory audit of consolidated financial statements could be further
examined to see to what extent the issues can be dealt with without legislative action.
The mechanism which might be set up at EU level in order to examine the question
of auditing standards (see paragraph 4.35 above) might usefully look at this subject.
In the absence of clear guidance at international level, an attempt might be made to
develop at EU level a set of principles which could guide the group auditor in this
matter.33
8. THE FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT AND THE FREEDOM TO
PROVIDE SERVICES
8.1 The Commission studies previously mentioned, have shown that there is at present
no European market for audit services. National audit markets in the EU mainly
function as separate markets, notwithstanding the fact that some forms of intra-
Union trade in audit services exist. Although the different laws and regulations may
not constitute an absolute barrier to intra-Union trade in audit services, they do make
establishment or services offered across borders more costly and / or less effective
and therefore less likely.
8.2 To the extent that an equivalent level of audit quality is established in all Member
States and to the extent that proper arrangements can be found which ensure that the
audit carried out in a particular Member State by a foreign individual or firm is
surrounded with guarantees which are at least equivalent to those which surround an
audit carried out by a local professional it should be possible to make progress in the
direction of an internal market for audit services.
Freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services for individuals
8.3 The freedom of establishment of an individual statutory auditor in another Member
State has been achieved, to a substantial extent, through Directive 89/48/EEC on the
mutual recognition of professional qualifications. Auditors who wish to practice in
another Member State, must acquire the qualification of this Member State but are
exempted from following the complete educational programme. They can obtain this
qualification, provided they pass an aptitude test. A possible alternative to
establishment in most Member States is to delegate audit work in another Member
State to an auditor established in that Member State. As this auditor would remain
liable for the statutory audit, this solution is not in fact often practised. The Mutual
Recognition Directive has only had a limited impact in the case of statutory auditors
in that only a small number of auditors have been approved under this regime.
8.4 Impediments to freedom of establishment come from the regulatory bodies of some
Member States which stipulate that their auditing laws and regulations also apply to
their auditors working in another Member State, even though these persons have
been approved to perform audit work under the law of the host country. In order to
be able to work simultaneously in each of the two countries, such persons must
respect, at the same time, the rules of the regulatory bodies of both countries, which
can sometimes be impossible. A possible solution would be the adoption by the
profession and the authorities, of a code of conduct proposing rules in cases of
conflict between the home Member State and the host Member State.34
8.5 As far as the freedom to provide cross-border audit services is concerned, most
Member States require individual professionals to have a professional establishment
on their territory. This requirement results from the need to maintain an active
monitoring of the professionals concerned so as to guarantee the quality of the
services they provide. It has been argued that where a professional auditor possesses
the title of the host Member State and respects the regulations of that country when
practising there, the obligation to have a professional establishment on the territory
of the country is an unnecessary burden. In this respect, the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Justice in the Ramrath case supports the argument that a Member
State can require a mere infrastructure and a certain effective presence of the
statutory auditor. As the study carried out for the Commission in 1996 points out, in
those Member States where there is no restriction on the delegation of audit work,
the foreign auditor can work under the responsibility of a national auditor in the host
country.
Freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services for audit firms
8.6 Freedom of establishment can first of all be exercised through the creation of a
subsidiary in another Member State. The creation of a subsidiary by a foreign audit
firm or for that matter the creation of an audit firm by foreign professionals is made
difficult by the fact that national laws and regulations directly restrict the
opportunities for foreign auditors to establish an audit firm. As the study carried out
for the Commission in 1996 points out, almost all Member States require that (more
than) the majority ownership and/ or (more than) the majority of management needs
to be in the hands of national statutory auditors. In addition, in  some Member
States, other legal forms than partnerships and sole proprietorships are not allowed.
This limits the possibility of the separation of ownership and management of audit
firms.
8.7 Compared to the provisions of the Eighth Directive, most Member States have
established stricter laws and regulations on the ownership, management and control
of audit firms. First, according to the Eighth Directive, audits may be carried out
both by natural persons and firms of auditors which may be legal persons or other
types of company, firms or partnership. Second, regarding ownership and
management, the Eighth Directive only requires a majority to be in the hands of
statutory auditors. In the case of management, the majority needs to be national
auditors or auditors who have furnished proof of the legal knowledge required for
purposes of the statutory auditing (Article 2(1)(b)(iii)). In the case of ownership, the
majority may consist of statutory auditors from other Member States (Article
2(1)(b)(ii)). A number of Member States require that the capital of an audit firm
should be held entirely by natural or legal persons (individuals or firms) having the
local statutory auditor title. In the same way, many Member States have interpreted
Article 2 (1)(b)(ii) of the Eighth Directive in such a way that a majority of the voting
rights in an audit firm must be held by natural persons or firms of auditors who are
approved under the law of the host country.
8.8 Similar problems arise when an audit firm wants to create a branch in a host Member
State. An additional problem in this context results from the fact that some Member35
States have limited the number of legal forms which an audit firm can take. This may
have as a consequence that a foreign audit firm which has a legal form which is not
allowed by the law of the host country cannot create a branch in that country.
8.9 As far as the freedom to provide cross-border audit services is concerned, the same
problems described above may arise when a foreign audit firm wishes to carry out a
statutory audit in a host country where it does not possess an establishment.
Priorities for action and possible methods
8.10 Despite the public interest considerations involved in the statutory audit, there is no
convincing reason why the Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment and
freedom to provide services should not fully apply to the trade in audit services.
8.11 Freedom of establishment (and to provide services) of individual statutory auditors is
already dealt with through Directive 89/48/EEC. Some problems remain. For
example, retaining the home country title after having obtained the host country title,
and possible differences in the scope of activity between the Member State of origin
and the host Member State. These problems could be further examined within the co-
ordinators group set up by Directive 89/48/EEC, possibly in combination with the
Contact Committee on the Accounting Directives, which is responsible for the
Eighth Directive and in close co-operation with national professional associations of
auditors.
8.12 Freedom of establishment for professional firms through the creation of a subsidiary
remains problematic because many Member States have established laws and
regulations which are more restrictive than those in the Eighth Directive. Member
States should be asked to remove those national requirements exceeding those of the
Eighth Directive. In this context, there is a need to clarify the meaning of Article 2 of
the Eighth Directive in order to prevent it from being interpreted too narrowly. Such
clarification should take place after consultation of the Contact Committee on the
Accounting Directives. To the extent that Member States have adopted national
dispositions which contain a discrimination on the grounds of nationality or non-
justified restrictions to the right of establishment, action will be promptly undertaken
in order to ensure respect for the provisions of the Treaty.
8.13 Without prejudice to the direct application of the relevant provisions of the Treaty,
for the freedom of establishment for professional firms through the creation of a
branch as well as for the freedom to provide cross-border audit services further
initiatives may be needed. These could take the form of a specific Directive which
complements Directive 89/48/EEC, as in discussion between the Commission and the
profession.36
9. CONCLUSION
9.1 This paper cannot deal exhaustively with the many sometimes very complicated
issues which surround the audit function. The matters dealt with are those which are
considered particularly relevant in the context of the Single Market.
9.2 In suggesting possible priorities for future action, particular attention has been given
to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, as enshrined in the Maastricht
Treaty. In conformity with the Communication on "Accounting Harmonisation : A
new strategy vis-à-vis international harmonisation", preference is given to an
approach which will allow a more coherent European view to be effectively
expressed in the international debate.
9.3 The underlying goal of this initiative is to contribute to a general raising of the level
of auditing in the EU, which will ultimately benefit to all parties concerned with the
life of companies.
9.4 Please send comments to European Commission - DG XV - D/3 - Financial
Information and Accounting Standards - 200, rue de la Loi - 1049 Brussels -
Belgium - ( Internet address d3@dg15.cec.be) - before 20 December 1996.
9.5 Comments received before 18 October 1996 will be taken into account in the
preparation of the Conference to be held on 5/6 December 1996 in Brussels on this
subject.37
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